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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WELDON S. ABBOTT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
NEWELL CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
NEWELL CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WELDON S. ABBOTT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17616 
This appeal is from a judgment rendered in a consoli-
dated trial of three separate actions. Two of the actions 
were initiated by Weldon s. Abbott, hereinafter referred to 
as Abbott, against Newell Christensen, hereinafter referred 
to as Christensen. In the first action, Abbott sought to re-
plevin 28 head of cattle which were retained by Christensen 
when a joint venture involving the two parties was termin-
-1-
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ated. The second action by Abbott sought to recover the 5~ 
of $29, 000. 00, the down payment on a real estate contract en-
tered into between Abbott as seller and Christensen as 
buyer. In the third of the three actions consolidated for 
trial, Christensen initiated suit against Abbott seeking t~ 
reformation of a real estate sales contract, and damages for 
breach of contract. 
Prior to the trial of the consolidated case, the 
parties stipulated to the appointment of a special master by 
the court for the purpose of determining the status of ac-
counts between the parties. Thereafter, both the court and 
counsel proceeded on the basis that the action was in the 
nature of an accounting between the parties and their joint 
operations between Fall 1970 and Spring 1975. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The consolidated case was tried on July 9, 1980, in 
the District Court for Duchesne County, before Judge J. 
Robert Bullock, without a jury. Judgment was entered on Feb· 
ruary 14, 1981 after the report and supplemental report of 
the special master had been filed, oral argument by counsel, 
and written memoranda submitted on behalf of both parties. 
The judgment required Abbott: 
1. Based on reports of the special master, 
to pay $47,663. 79 to Christensen, 
2. To deposit 424 shares of Farnsworth Canal 
Irrigation Company stock in an escrow account for 
delivery to Christensen; and, 
-2-
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3. To quitclaim to Christensen, any interest he 
had in properties formerly used in the partner-
ship known as the Birch No. 1 Place, Birch No. 2 
Place, and the Lindsay Place. 
Said judgment required Christensen: 
1. To quitclaim to Abbott, any interest he had 
in properties formerly used in the partnership 
known as the Bleazard Place, the Whitehead Place, 
and the Taylor Place; 
2. To release his claim to use of a registered 
brand formerly used in the partnership; and, 
3. Pay Abbott the $29,000.00 down payment owed 
on the Lindsay Place. 
In addition, the judgment affirmed Abbott's right to 
funds paid into escrow under a real eastate sales contract 
between the parties and to possession of a quarter horse 
mare and her colt. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a Judgment of this court: 
1. That the reports of the special master did not 
conform to the stipulation of the parties and the order of 
the trial court appointing him and that the Judgment award-
ing Christensen $47,663.79, which was based upon the reports 
of the special master, be reversed. 
2. That this court remand the case to the trial 
court with instructions that the accounting give Abbott 
credit for his capital contributions. 
-3-
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3. That the Reary Place contract between the par-
ties did not include the 424 shares of Farnsworth Canal Irri-
gation Company stock and that the decision of the lower 
court awarding said stock to Christensen be reversed. 
4. That the decision of the lower court that the 
Zane Christensen purchase contract was not part of the joint 
operation of the parties be reversed and Abbott be given 
credit for the amount of the down payment in the joint ven-
ture accounting. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Abbott and Christensen first met in the fall of 
1970. There were discussions betweeen the parties regarding 
the possibility of Christensen feeding and caring for catt~ 
that Abbott intended to acquire. At the time of the dis-
cussions, Christensen was employed by the Forest Service. 
(Tr. 55) 
The parties agreed that Christensen would care for 
Abbott's cattle. In compensation, Christensen was to re-
ceive a monthly draw of $500.00 and live in a home on the 
Reary Place, a ranch owned by Abbott. Further, the parties 
agreed that Christensen would receive one-half of the net 
proceeds from calf sales after deducting expenses of the ven-
ture. (Tr. 55-57) 
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Christensen moved into the home on the Reary Place 
in 1971. He occupied the home as his residence from that 
time forward without the payment of rent. Thereafter, there 
were certain real estate purchases made as set forth below. 
I Tr. 56) 
The first tract of ground purchased was the Reary 
property, in January of 1971. (Tr. 389) Abbott issued 
checks from his personal account for $29,500.00 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibits 48, 49, and 50), and signed a note for $14,500.00. 
The property was then deeded to Abbott. <Plaintiff's Exhibit 
35) Included in this purchase was farm equipment, <Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 36) and 424 shares of Farnsworth Canal 
Irrigation Company stock. 
The next purchase was made on April 1, 1971 of the 
Bleazard Ranch for a total of $165,000.00, payable 
$25,000.00 down, $24,000.00 from Abbott's personal account 
and $1,0000.00 from the Walker Bank ranch account. (Plain-
tiff's Exhibits 15, 51 and 52) In addition, two tracts of 
ground belonging to Christensen were traded to Bleazard for 
a credit of $35,000.00 on the contract of purchase. <Tr. 
397-399) Sixty cows were also purchased from Bleazard but 
were not included in the sales contract. The cows were paid 
for separately. (Tr. 397) 
The two Birch properties were purchased with funds 
from the Ranch Account totalling $19,140.49. (Plaintiff's 
-5-
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Exhibits 39, 57-61, 64) At the time Birch No. 1 was pur-
chased, Abbott gave a personal check for approximately 
$11,000.00 for the balance of the down payment. (Tr. 
401, 402, 406) The Birch estate was in probate and the check 
was held for about two years and when presented for payment, 
the bank refused to honor it. (Tr. 404) At that time, 
Christensen borrowed $15,000.00 from Zions Bank, which was 
deposited in the Zions Ranch account and from which the ~~ 
ment was made on the Birch No. 1. (Tr. 405) 
The Taylor property was purchased January 17, 1973 
by Abbott entirely from his own funds for the sum of 
$16,000.00. Neither water stock, machinery or cattle were 
included in this purchase. (Tr. 389) 
The next purchase was the Lindsay Ranch on June 21, 
1973, for a total price of $100, 000. 00. The $29, 000. 00 down 
payment was made from the Walker Bank ranch account. (Tr. 
92, Plaintiff's Exhibits 16, 23, and 24) This contract in-
cluded 149 head of cattle, 65 sheep and farm equipment as 
listed in a Bill of Sale. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16) 
The Whitehead Ranch was purchased for the sum of 
$105, 000. 00 on April 2, 1974, with the $26, 000. 00 down pay-
ment being made from the Walker Bank Ranch Account. (Plain-
tiff's Exhibits 18 and 66) The Whitehead Ranch included 
both cows and machinery. (Tr. 428-429) 
-6-
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The last real estate transaction was on June 14, 
1974, when ranch property of Zane Christensen was purchased 
on contract for $681,000.00. The $50,000.00 down payment 
was made by a $30,000.00 check from the Walker Bank ranch 
account and $20,000.00 in checks from the Zions Bank ranch 
account. The contract was in both Christensen's and 
Abbott's names. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 14, 76, 77, 78) 
Abbott and Christensen mutually agreed to terminate 
their operation in the spring of 1975. In accordance with 
their oral agreement, the parties divided the various tracts 
of real property. To effect the divisions, Abbott, in each 
instance, prepared a new contract wherein the individual who 
was to receive the subject real property was shown as the 
Buyer and the other party was shown as the Seller. (Tr. 
427-428 and Plaintiff's Exhibits 62, 73, 74, and 79) The 
trial Court found these contracts to be fully integrated con-
tracts. (Record- Civil No. 5800 file, page 83- FF#6l 
Regarding the Reary Place and the Lindsay Place, the 
contracts from Abbott as Seller to Christensen as Buyer, 
were similar to the original purchase contracts. However, 
whereas the original Reary contract specifically included 
424 shares of irrigation water and certain personal property 
the contract of sale to Christensen did not include these 
items. (Tr. 391-392 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 14l 
-7-
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In preparing the contract selling the Lindsay Place ~ 
Christensen, Abbott also excluded the personal property. 
The Lindsay Place contract from Abbott to Christensen re-
cited a down payment of $29, 000. 00. Christensen did not pay 
the $29, 000. 00. (Record- Civil No. 5800 file, page 83, FF#91 
On November 1, 1974, also as part of the termination 
agreement, Abbott entered into a contract to sell the Zane 
Christensen Place to Christensen. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 791 
Althought that contract recites a down payment of 
$50,000.00, Abbott never received that amount from 
Christensen. (Tr. 436-439) 
As part of the termination agreement, Christensen 
cared for certain cows which belonged to Abbott. The cows 
were watered and fed by Christensen following termination of 
the venture until various dates in 1975. (Tr. 443-444) 
Abbott contends that Christensen did not surrender control 
of 60 head of cows which belonged to Abbott under the terms 
of the oral termination agreement. (Tr. 86-90, 101-103) 
Prior to the trial, the parties stipulated to the 
appointment of a special master. (Record-Civil No. 5799 
file, page 65l. The stipulation required the special master 
to: 
audit the documents submitted and determine 
as far as possible therefrom the status of accoun~s 
between the parties taking into account the relative 
values of the real estate in question, as well as 
the basis for division of profits from the cattle 
operation, and the division of real estate upon 
-8-
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termination of the venture, and the monetary and 
other valuable contributions made by the respective 
parties. " 
However, in making his report, the special master, as 
instructed by the trial court, disregarded the personal 
property which was distributed on termination of the venture 
!Tr. 515-519). Further, that report included income items 
which were not part of the agreed upon profit from the "sale 
of calves". (Record-Civil No. 6169 file, page 128). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IN AN EQUITY CASE, THE APPEAL MAY BE ON QUESTIONS OF BOTH 
LAW AND FACT. THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT WERE BASED 
UPON AN ACCOUNTING BETWEEN JOINT VENTURERS WHICH IS AN 
EQUITABLE ACTION. 
The Utah Constitution states that, "In equity cases 
the appeal may be on questions of both law and fact. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 9. This 
directive of the people has been codified in Rule 72 (a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The law regarding the nature of an accounting between 
former members of a joint venture is well settled. This 
Court has recognized that such an action is in equity. 
Stevens v. Gray, 123 U. 395, 398, 259 P.2d 889 (1953), 
West v. West, 16 u. 2d 411, 413, 403 P. 2d 22 ( 1965). 
In Child v. Hayward, 16 U.2d 351, 352, 400 P.2d 
758 11965), this court announced the standard it would 
use in reviewing the facts: 
-9-
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.. it is our duty to review the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences fairly to be 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the findings and judgment." 
Further, in reviewing equity cases: 
" ... the findings of the trial courts on 
conflicting evidence will not be set aside 
unless it manifestly appears that the Court 
misapplied proven facts or made findings 
clearly against the weight of evidence." 
Olinero v. Elganti, 61 u. 475, 479, 
214 P. 313 (1923), Ream v. Fitzen, 
581 P. 2d 145, 147 ( 1978). 
The appellant asserts that, in applying these 
standards, this Court will find that the evidence adduced 
at trial will not support the findings presented by the 
special master and adopted by the trial court. (Record-
Civil No. 5800 file, p. 82 FF#l and p. 127 Supplement 
FF#2l Nor does the evidence support the trial court's 
Findings of Fact numbers 2, 7, and 8 and Conclusions of 
Law numbers 1 and 6. (Record-Civil No. 5800 file, pp.82-
84) 
POINT II. 
THE REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL MASTER DID NOT CONFORM TO THE 
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES IN THAT THEY FAILED TO TAKE INTO 
ACCOUNT THE VALUES OF THE REAL ESTATE IN QUESTION, THE DIVI-
SION OF REAL ESTATE UPON TERMINATION OF THE VENTURE, AND THE 
MONETARY AND OTHER VALUABLE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE RESPEC-
TIVE PARTIES. 
-10-
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After consolidation of the cases and prior to trial, 
Abbott and Christensen stipulated to the appointment of a 
special master. Under the terms of the stipulation, the 
special master was: 
.. to receive and review the documentary evidence 
from the respective parties which evidence shall 
include all bills, receipts, checks, deposit slips, 
contracts of sale, bills of sale, prior accountings, 
tax returns and any other records - - - covering 
the joint operations . . . between the fall of 1970 
and the spring of 1975." (Record- Civil No. 5799 
file, p.65) 
Upon completion of his audit of the documents sub-
rnitted, the special master was to: 
.. determine as far as possible therefrom the 
status of accounts between the parties taking 
into account the relative values of real estate 
in question as well as the basis for division 
of profits from the cattle operation, and of 
the venture, and the monetary and other valuable 
contributions made by the respective parties." 
(Record- Civil No. 5799 file, p. 65). 
After receiving documents from the parties, holding 
a hearing to discuss various matters, and attending court 
sessions, the special master produced four reports. One 
dated August 21, 1979, is in the envelope with the 
exhibits, although not so marked. The others are located 
in the record on appeal as follows: Report dated October 
8, 1980 is in civil No. 6169 file, p.128-130; report 
dated February 26, 1980 is located in Civil No. 5799 
file, p. 72; and report dated February 18, 1981 is 
-11-
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attached to Supplement to Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law in Civil No. 5800 file, p. 127-128). 
According to the reports, the special master con-
sidered the following items in his accounting: 
1. Income from the sale of calves, sheep, lambs, 
beef, and fill dirt; 
2. Operating expenses paid to Christensen and 
others; 
3. Wages earned by and paid to Christensen; 
4. Overdraft in the Zion's First National Bank 
ranch account and overdraft charges on that 
account; 
5. Contributions to the joint venture working 
capital made by Christensen and certain of his 
personal expenses; 
6. Credits to Christensen for the care of Abbott's 
cattle after the termination of the joint 
venture; 
7. Credits to Christensen for cattle and calves 
replevied by Abbott; and, 
8. Credit to Abbott for the down payment due from 
Christensen on the Lindsay Place contract of 
sale. 
Upon the completion of trial, the special master was 
directed by the Court to determine the operating capital 
of the joint venture. In that determination, he was to 
disregard Abbott's cost of money [interest expense] to 
acquire the land and cattle (Tr. 515) and to disregard 
Abbott's investment in land and cattle. (Tr. 516) 
-12-
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distribution of profits owing to partners, Section 48-1-37 
12), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Christensen argued that the distribution of joint 
venture real property was separate from any capital con-
tribution and division of joint venture calves. (Tr. 106> 
However, inasmuch as the real property constituted part 
of Abbott's capital contribution (Tr. 56, 65), it is un-
conscionable to give Christensen credit for his capital 
contributions and not give Abbott credit for his capital 
contributions. 
Appellant requests this court to hold that the 
accounting made by the special master was incomplete in 
that it did not recognize appellant's capital contribu-
tions to the joint venture. Further, that the matter be 
remanded to the lower court with instructions to take 
appellant's capital contributions into account and 
recalculate the accounts of the parties in accordance 
with the rules of distribution in Section 48-1-37, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
POINT III. 
THE ZANE CHRISTENSEN RANCH PROPERTY WAS PURCHASED DURING THE 
PERIOD IN WHICH THE PARTIES WERE OPERATING THEIR JOINT VEN-
TURE. ABBOTT SHOULD RECEIVE CREDIT IN THE JOINT VENTURE 
ACCOUNTING FOR MAKING THE DOWN PAYMENT. 
In June of 1977, Abbott and Christensen entered into 
a contract, <Plaintiff's Exhibit #19> to purchase proper-
-14-
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Abbott submits that the Court erred in placing these 
restrictions upon the special master. In support of this 
contention, we invite attention to the stipulation of the 
parties wherein the accounting was to include, "the divi-
sion of real estate upon termination" and "the monetary 
and other valuable contributions made by the respective 
parties." Id. Failure to include Abbott's capital con-
tributions while including Christensen's has lead to an 
inequitable result. 
Abbott urges further that as a " ... general rule 
applicable to dissolution in the case of a joint venture 
. in the absence of an express agreement to the con-
trary, the person advancing capital is entitled to its 
return before there is a division of income or profits." 
46 Am Jur 2d 56, citing Saunders v. McDonough, 191 Ala. 
119, 67 So. 591 ( 1914): Tiffany v. Short, 22 Cal 2d 
531, 139 P.2d 939 (1943l; Consolidated Fisheries Co. vs. 
Consolidated Soluables Co. <Supl 35 Del. Ch. 125, 112 
A.2d 30, Supp. op. 35 Del. Ch. 178, 113 A.2d 576 (1955). 
This court has held that distribution in joint venture 
cases is governed by the Uniform Partnership Act. See ~ 
v. Fitzen, at 148. Under Section 48-1-37, Utah Code Annot~ 
ted, 1953, as amended, capital contributions of partners are 
recognized as liabilities of the partnership. As such, in 
distribution of partnership assets, they rank ahead of the 
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ty known as the Peterson Place from Zane T. Christensen 
and Flora Christensen. The contract called for a down 
Oayment of $200,00.00. Of that amount, $50,000.00 was 
receipted for in the contract. Both Abbott and Christen-
sen signed the contract. 
The $50,000.00 down payment was made in the form of 
three checks. Check one was written in favor of Zane 
Christensen in the amount of $30,000.00, dated 6-18-74, 
signed by Abbott and drawn on the joint venture's Walker 
Bank ranch account. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 76 and Tr. 434l 
Check two was written in favor of Zane Christensen in the 
amount of $15,000.00, dated 6-18-74, signed by Abbott and 
drawn on the joint venture's ranch account at Zion's 
First National Bank in Roosevelt. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 77 
and Tr. 434) Check three was written in favor of Zane 
Christensen in the amount of $5,000.00, dated June 1974, 
signed by Newell Christensen, the respondent, and drawn 
on the joint venture's Zion's First National Bank ranch 
account in Roosevelt. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 78 and Tr. 
434) 
According to Christensen's own testimony, the Peter-
son Place, (also referred to at various places in the 
trial record as the Zane Christensen property), was oper-
ated as part of the joint venture. 
"Q. Have you ever operated the land known 
as the Peterson Place that you bought 
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from Zane Christensen? 
"A. Yes. We run it in 1974." (Tr. 308) 
As testified to by Abbott and undisputed by 
Christensen, the $50,000.00 down payment on the Peterson 
Place was made wholly from funds supplied by Abbott. (Tr. 
439) Yet, in accordance with the Court's directions, the 
special master ignored Abbott's capital contribution 
toward the Pet~rson Place down payment when preparing his 
report. (Tr. 516, 517) 
In accordance with the oral termination agreement, 
Abbott prepared a contract of sale dated November 1, 1974 
describing the Zane Christensen property from himself as 
seller to Newell Christensen as buyer. (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 79) 
The signatures of Abbott, his wife, and Christensen 
are all affixed to the contract. The contract recites a 
down payment of $200,000.00, consisting of $50,000.00 
cash and a $150,000.00 note as in the original contract 
between the parties to this action and Zane Christensen. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 79) 
Christensen, however denies ever having agreed to 
repay the $50,000.00 cash down payment to Abbott (Tr. 
561) Christensen's other testimony on the subject of the 
down payment was contradictory. He testified that he 
already paid $25,000.00. (Tr. 210-211) And, he stated 
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that he had no funds of his own with which to make the re-
quired down payment. <Tr. 2201 
After Abbott and Christensen entered into the con-
tract of sale for the Zane Christensen place [Abbott to 
Christensen], Zane Christensen sent a letter to Abbott 
regarding default in payment under the terms of the con-
tract of purchase between the joint venture and Zane 
Christensen. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 201 Christensen testi-
fied to receiving a similar letter. (Tr. 220> He fur-
ther testified that Zane Christensen sent a second letter 
terminating the contract in February of 1975. {Tr. 218) 
As was argued above, under Point II, to take into 
account the capital contributions of Christensen in prep-
aration of the joint venture accounting while disregard-
ing Abbott's capital contributions is unconscionable. If 
this result is allowed to stand, Christensen will be the 
benefactor of Abbott's $50,000.00 loss. First, he re-
ceived property paid for by Abbott upon termination of 
the joint venture. Next, under the special master's 
report, he also receives a full return of his own capital 
contributions while Abbott's contributions to the joint 
venture's capital are completely disregarded. 
In order for an equitable result to occur in this 
joint venture accounting, Abbott requests that this Court 
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remand with instructions to make a full accounting. 
With such full accounting to include: 
1. All capital contributions made by the parties 
(including Abbott's $50,000.00 down payment on the Zane 
Christensen/Peterson Place); 
2. The profits as agreed upon by the parties; 
3. All expenses of the joint venture; including 
interest expense; and, 
4. The distribution of joint venture property made 
at its termination. 
POINT IV. 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE PARTIES SUPPORTS ABBOTT'S CONTENTION 
THAT THE ONLY PROFITS TO BE SHARED WERE FROM THE SALE OF 
CALVES. 
In Finding of Fact #2, the trial Court stated: 
"That the agreement under which the parties operated 
from 1971 until the end of December,1974, was that 
plaintiff was to furnish all land and all cattle and 
that defendant was to operate the venture for whicl 
he was to receive one-half of any net profits from 
the operation after deducting operating expenses. 
The defendant was to receive a guarantee of $500 per 
month, and any losses from the operation were to ~ 
plaintiff's." (Record-Civil No. 5800 file, pp. 82-
83) 
The part of the finding relating to profits is in 
direct opposition to the testimony of both Christensen 
and his wife, Maxine. 
On direct examination, Christensen stated his under-
standing of the joint venture agreement. In response to 
a question regarding the terms of the operation, Christen-
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sen stated: "Dr. Abbott was to buy the land and cattle. 
I was to be guaranteed $500 a month plus half the calf 
cro£ [Emphasis Added] <Tr. 65) On cross-
examination, Christensen modified his testimony, stating, 
.. when the calf crop was sold, the ranch expense was 
to come out of the calf crop and we were to split what 
was left." <Tr. 75) This was reiterated on further cross 
examination, Vith the added statement that the agreement 
was never changed. (Tr. 75) 
On direct examination, Maxine Christensen, the re-
spondent's wife, answered in the affirmative when asked 
whether her testimony would "be in substance" the same as 
her husband's regarding the arrangements between Abbott 
and Christensen. (Tr. 339-340) 
It is apparent that Christensen's testimony is in 
agreement with Abbott's contention and understanding that 
only profits from the sale of calves were to be shared. 
Abbott's own understanding of the agreement was elicited 
on direct examination: " ... as we got some cows I would 
guarantee him [Christensen] a draw of $500 a month 
against net profit in the long run. As we ran more cows, 
then he would share in .•• the profits above ••• all 
expenses being taken out." (Tr. 571 
The final report of the special master attributes 
profits from the sale of sheep ($1,104), lambs ($3,0821, 
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beef ($552), and fill dirt ($6,174) to the joint venture 
in the total amount of $10,992. (Report of special 
master- Civil No. 6169 file, p. 128). 
Appellant respectfully urges this Court to hold that 
the weight of evidence clearly shows the agreement of the 
parties was to share only the profits from the sale of 
calves. Hence, that the profits attributed to the joint 
venture from the sale of sheep, lambs, beef, and fill 
dirt in the amount of $10,992.00 should be excluded from 
the final accounting of the parties. 
POINT V. 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT THAT 
ALL LOSSES FROM THE OPERATION WERE TO BE ABBOTT'S. 
Abbott's testimony on direct examination presents 
his understanding of the original joint venture agreement 
(Tr. 57-59). In summary, he testified to ( l) a $500 draw 
against profits by Cby the parties. This understanding 
was reinforced by Abbott's testimony on 
cross-examination. (Tr. 61, 62) 
Christensen's testimony on direct examination pre-
sents his understanding of the original joint venture 
agreement (Tr. 65, 73). He testified to (1) Abbott's pur-
chase of real property and livestock, (2) a $500 per 
month guarantee, (3) division of the calf crop after 
deduction of expenses, and (4) an agreement to make a 
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future agreement for an interest in the operation. This 
testimony was reiterated on cross-examination <Tr. 75). 
As was noted supra, Christensen's wife, Maxine, testified 
to the same understanding of the original joint venture 
agreement. (Tr. 339-340> 
Upon reading the testimony of the parties, it can be 
seen that no understanding was reached regarding the shar-
ing of joint venture losses. Therefore, absent any other 
facts to the contrary, it follows that Finding of Fact #2 
regarding, ". . . any losses from the operation . 
being attributed to Abbott has no factual support. 
If the partners did not have an express agreement 
relating to the sharing of losses, how should the losses 
of the venture be distributed? This Court has supplied 
the answer, stating: "A joint venture should remain joint 
whether it results in a gain or a loss, unless the par-
ties otherwise contract." Producer's Livestock Market-
ing v. Christensen, 588 P. 2d 156, 158 < 1978). In Pro-
ducer's Livestock the parties had engaged in a joint ven-
ture similar to the instant case. Producer's Livestock 
put up the capital and the other party, Zane Christensen, 
furnished expertise in buying, feeding, managing, and 
selling cattle with an oral agreement to share profits. 
Ultimately, the venture incurred a loss. This Court deter-
mined that in the absence of an agreement to the con-
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trary, losses must be shared by the joint venturers. 
Applying the Producer's Livestock logic to the instant 
loss, the joint venturers must share jointly in any 
losses. 
The Abbott and Christensen venture was similar to, 
if not in reality, a partnership. Section 48-1-4(4), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, states that 
. receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a 
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in 
the business ... " By agreement, Abbott and Christensen 
shared profits in their joint business. 
Under partnership law, when there is no express 
agreement regarding the sharing or distribution of 
partnership losses, the law states that losses, whether 
capital or otherwise, are to be distributed in the same 
proportion as profits. 48-1-15(1), Utah Code.Annotated. 
60 Arn Jur 2d 39. While Abbott does not here argue that 
the joint business constituted a partnership, Christensen 
has repeatedly referred to the joint venture as a partner-
ship. (E.g., Record-Civil No. 5799 file, pp. 19-23) The 
similarity with a partnership tends to support applica-
tion of partnership law requiring sharing of losses in 
the same proportions as profits. 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court rule that 
all losses of the joint business should be shared equally 
between Abbott and Christensen and that the case be 
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remanded to the lower Court with instructions to make 
adjustments in accordance with this ruling. 
POINT VI. 
THE COWS REPLEVIED BY ABBOTT ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS CAPITAL 
CONTRIBUTION AND RIGHTFULLY BELONGED TO ABBOTT UNDER THE 
AGREEMENT TERMINATING THE JOINT VENTURE. 
In the fall of 1973, the joint venture cows produced 
a number of calves that were held back from sale because 
calf prices were so low. (Tr. 86) The calves remained 
the property of the joint venture until it terminated. 
By the time the termination occurred, they had matured to 
adult cows and had produced calves of their own. (Tr. 
241-242) 
Abbott testified that inasmuch as the ~ in the 
joint venture were to belong to him, the calves held over 
from 1973, now grown into cows, belonged to him. (Tr. 88) 
Further, he testified that Christensen was given credit 
for any interest he might claim in the now grown calves 
at the termination of the joint venture. (Tr. 89, 103) 
Abbott demanded that Christensen turn-over the sub-
ject cows to him a part of the termination settlement. In 
response to Christensen's refusal, the cows were replev-
ied by Abbott. (Tr. 89) 
In the special master's report of October 8, 1980, 
Christensen is given credit for $9,620. (Record- Civil 
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No. 6169 file, pages 128-130) This amount represents the 
value that the special master placed on the replevied 
cows. 
Appellant refers the Court to Plaintiff's Exhibit 
#81. This document represents Plaintiffs unrebutted 
testimony regarding the relative value of the real proper-
ty which was divided among the parties upon termination 
of the joint venture. (Tr. 455) Table I, below, repre-
sents a tabulation of the difference between the cost of 
each property and remaining mortgage or contract balance 
at the time the joint venture was terminated. 
TABLE I 
(Property Distributed to Christensen on Termination) 
Mortgage 
Pro12erty Cost* Balance* 
Birch u $ 70,000.00 $ 61,096.00 
Birch #2 16,000.00 7,100.00 
Zane C. 643,000.00 593,000.00 
Lindsay 100,000.00 69,176.00 
Reary 52,000.00 35,000.00 
Total Gain to Christensen 
* figures from Exhibit #81 
. (Gain) 
Difference 
$ 8, 904. 00 
8, 900. 00 
50,000.00 
30,824.00 
17,000.00 
$115. 628. 00 
As can be seen, Christensen's gain on the termina-
tion is $115,628.00 based on cost. Based on market value 
(Table II, infra), the gain is $596,128.00. 
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TABLE II 
(Property Distributed to Christensen on Termination) 
Market Mortgage <Gain) 
ProEerty Value Balance* Difference 
Birch #1 $315,500.00 $ 61,096.00 $254,404.00 
Birch #2 40,000.00 7,100.00 32,900.00 
Zane C. 765,000.00 593,000.00 172,000.00 
Lindsay 160,000.00 69,176.00 90,824.00 
Reary 81,000.00 35,000.00 46i000.00 
Total Gain to Christensen ~~96 1 128 1 00 
•figures from Exhibit #81 
It is readily apparent that Christensen has been well 
compensated for any interest he claims to have in the cows 
which were replevied by Abbott. Even using Christensen's 
"gain" based upon "cost" <$115,628.00l from Table I, and 
less the $9,620.00 that the special master calculated, 
Christensen had a net gain of ($115,628.00 - $9,620.00) 
$106,008.00 from the real property distribution. Using 
Christensen's gain based on market value <$596,128.00l from 
Table II, Christensen had a net gain of ($596,128.00 -
$9,620. 00) $586, 508. 00. 
To avoid an inequitable result, appellant urges this 
Court to affirm his ownership of the repleived cows and to 
hold that Christensen is not entitled to a credit for those 
cows. 
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POINT VII. 
THE AWARD TO CHRISTENSEN FOR CARE OF ABBOTT'S COWS WAS IN 
CONTRAVENTION OF THE PARTIES AGREEMENT. 
In the special master's report of October 8, 1980, 
Christensen is given a credit of $17,785.98 for the care a~ 
feeding of 185 cows that belonged to Abbott. The care and 
feeding took place in 1975 after termination of the joint 
venture between the parties. The special master's calcula-
tions were based upon figures elicited during the testimony 
of respondent's witness, Mr. Johnny Fausett. (Record- Civil 
No. 6169 file, pages 128-130) 
Abbott testified that Christensen agreed to care for 
and feed the cows as part of the joint venture termination 
agreement. (Tr. 443-444) In support of this testimony, 
Abbott points to the more than generous termination 
settlement with Christensen. In that settlement, Abbott 
deeded real property to Christensen with a cost basis in 
excess of mortgages of $115,628.00, (Table I, supra) and a 
market value basis in excess of mortgages of $586,508.00. 
(Table II, supra) 
Both parties agreed that Christensen was to care for 
the joint venture cows which were retained by Abbott, (Tr. 
304,443) Christensen, however, denies that he was to care 
for the cows as part of the settlement agreement. (Tr. 304, 
305 l Christensen testified that he assumed Abbott would pay 
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him the same amount ($500.00 per month) that was being paid 
during the existence of the joint venture. (Tr. 258) 
One of the duties undertaken by Christensen in caring 
for Abbott's cows was their feeding. Christensen testified 
that he fed the cows hay which was produced by the joint ven-
ture during 1974. (Tr. 254) Abbott testified that as part 
of the termination agreement the hay was to belong to him. 
He also testified that there was sufficient hay to provide 
for the cows during the winter. (Tr. 426) 
Christensen's testimony was that the hay from the 1974 
operation was to go to each party on a "prospective basis." 
<Tr. 248) This was in conflict with Abbott's testimony 
wherein he stated that "there was no reason to give any of 
it away [to Christensen] and then buy some more." <Tr. 426> 
Abbott urges that the Court look to the equity of the 
real estate division and the fact that Christensen obtained 
a great deal of wealth from a minimal investment as a result 
of the termination settlement. It is entirely reasonable 
that Christensen was willing to give up the 1974 hay crop in 
exchange for the real property he received on termination of 
the joint venture. 
POINT VIII. 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE AWARD TO CHRISTENSEN FOR CARE OF ABBOTT'S 
COWS WAS EXCESSIVE AND UNJUSTIFIED. 
-27-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the alternative, Abbott argues that the special mas-
ter overcompensated Christensen in calculating the costs of 
caring for the cows. The special master relied upon Johnny 
Fausett's testimony in calculating the costs. (Record-
Civil No. 6169 file, pages 128-129) Mr. Fausett was apparent-
ly in the cattle raising business. He testified to being 
"responsible for 9, 000 head of cattle" during 1975. (Tr, 
123) 
Abbott urges that the cost figures testified to by ~. 
Fausett and used by the special master do not apply to the 
situation in the joint venture. First, Mr. Fausett was 
caring for 9,000 cattle versus the small number of cows 
cared for by Christensen. There is an obvious difference in 
the scale of operations including number of employees and 
amount of equipment. Further, Mr. Fausett's figures do not 
take into account the fact that Christensen used Abbott's 
hay to feed the cows. (Tr. 261) 
If the Court disregards Abbott's contention that 
Christensen agreed to care for the cows as part of the set-
tlement, it is inequitable to grant Christensen recovery on 
Fausett's figures. Christensen himself testified to the 
fact he assumed he would only be paid $500.00 per month 
while he was feeding the cows from the termination of the 
venture through May 20th (when the cows would no longer be 
on feed). (Tr. 258,263) He further testified that he used 
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both Abbott's and his own hay [from the Reary Place] and 
that no hay was purchased. (Tr. 261) 
By Christensen's own testimony, he calculated three 
cows to a bale of hay per day. (Tr. 254) He further testi-
fied that he fed Abbott's 185 cows a little over 6,000 bales 
of hay. (Tr. 261,263) Christensen testified that a bale of 
hay was worth $1.50 at the time he cared for Abbott's cows. 
(Tr. 263) Based on these figures, Christensen fed Abbott's 
cows (6,000 x $1.50) $9,000.00 worth of "his own" hay. I-f 
Christensen is credited with $500.00 per month from January 
through May 20th, when the cows were taken off feed, he 
would accrue total monthly "guarantee" charges of $500. 00 x 
4 2/3 months= $2,334.00. The total feed costs ($9,000.00l 
and the total monthly "guarantee" ($2,334.00l equals 
$11,334.00. This is the greatest amount that could be 
allowed based on Christensen's own figures. 
However, the Court should take into consideration the 
fact that Abbott's own hay was also used in feeding the 
cows. In 1975, May 20th was the 140th day of the year. If 
Christensen fed Abbott's 185 cows for 140 days at one bale 
per three cows, it would take 140 days x 185 cows= 25,900/3 
cows per bale = 8,633 bales of hay. 
Even if Christensen and Abbott had divided the joint 
venture hay equally, one-half of the hay fed to Abbott's 
cows was his own property and not chargable to him (no hay 
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was purchased to feed the cows). Thus, Christensen should 
only be credited with 8,633/2 = 4,316.5 bales of hay. At 
$1.50 per bale, this equals $6,474. 75 for the hay. Adding 
the $2,334.00 total monthly "guarantee" to the $6,474.75 for 
the hay, the total credit is equal to $8,808.75. 
Abbott urges that if Christensen is to recover anythi~ 
for the care of Abbott's cows, the amount should not be 
based on Johnny Fausett' s testimony. Rather, that recovery 
should be $8,808.75 based upon Christensen's own testimony, 
adjusted to give Abbott credit for the use of his own hay. 
POINT IX. 
UNDER UTAH LAW, CHRISTENSEN IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE 424 
SHARES OF FARNSWORTH CANAL IRRIGATION COMPANY STOCK. 
Abbott and Christensen are in dispute as to whether the 
contract of December 21, 1974 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 14> for 
sale of the Reary Place, with Abbott as Seller and Christen· 
sen as Buyer, included 424 shares of Farnsworth Canal Irriga· 
tion Company stock. Abbott testified that in personally pre· 
paring the contract, he purposely did not include the stock 
in the contract for sale of the real property. (Tr. 393) 
When Abbott prepared contracts dividing real property, he 
simply copied the original contract of purchase and made 
what changes he thought appropriate. He did this on all of 
the contracts. (Tr. 427-428) 
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The trial court in its preliminary findings, at the 
completion of trial and presentation of evidence, held that 
the contract of sale did not include the stock. (Tr. 518, 
519) However, after submission of memoranda by counsel for 
the parties, (Record, Civil No. 5800 file, p. 62-80 and 
Civil No. 5799 file, p. 139-146) the trial court decided 
that "the parties thereto agreed and intended to agree that" 
the stock was included in the sale. (Record- Civil No. 5800 
file, p. 83- FF#7l 
Abbott submits that Christensen did not overcome the re-
buttable presumption that water rights represented by shares 
of stock in a corporation do not pass to the grantee as an 
appurtenance to the land upon which the water right was 
used. Section 73-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amend-
ed, has been held to create such a presumption. Brimm v. 
Cache Valley Banking Co., 2 U.2d 93,99, 269 P.2d 859 
( 1954). Hatch v. Adams, 7 U. 2d 73, 75, 318 P. 2d 633 
(1957). The relevant part of that statute reads: 
"Water rights, whether evidenced by decrees, by certif-
icates of appropriation, by diligence claims to the 
use of surface or underground water or by water users' 
claims filed in general determination proceedings, 
shall be transferred by deed in substantially the same 
manner as real estate, except when they are represent-
ed by shares of stock in a corporation, in which case 
water shall not be deemed to be appurtenant to the 
land ... " 
This Court established the standard for overcoming the 
presumption when it stated that a grantee must show (ll by 
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"clear and convincing evidence" that the water right was 
appurtenant and, 12) that "the granter intended to transf~ 
the water right with the land, even though no express men-
tion of any water right was made in the deed." Brirrun, 
supra. at 99. 
With respect to the first part of that standard, 
Christensen attempted to show that the water was appurtenant 
to the land through the testimony of Fred Lindsay, Secre~ry 
for the Farnsworth Canal Irrigation Company, !hereinafter 
Farnsworth). This was undertaken through questioning de-
signed to determine how long the previous owners of the 
Reary Place had also owned stock in Farnsworth (Tr. 227) 
Insofar as that testimony is concerned, however, this Court 
stated: 
"We are of the opinion that proof that water 
represented by water stock was used on certain 
land by the owner of the land during the entire 
period of his ownership of the land is not alone 
sufficient to rebut the presumption that such 
water is not to be deemed apprutenant." Hatch, 
supra at 75-76. 
Going further in his attempt to show the water should 
be deemed appurtenant, Christensen has argued that without 
water, the Reary Place is valueless and that no one would 
purchase such land without water. However, Abbott has testi· 
fied without rebuttal that during the operation of the joint 
venture, the Taylor ranch in the same vicinity was purchased 
without water. (Tr. 39ll He also testified that it was his 
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intention to transfer the water stock in question to the Tay-
lor ranch after the ditches were repaired. (Tr. 3 9 2) 
Except for Christensen's testimony noted above, the 
only evidence relating to the value of the Reary Place with-
out water was Plaintiff's Exhibit 81. 
However, Mr. Lindsay did testify to the value of the 
water stock at the time the Reary Place was transferred to 
Christensen. He estimated that value at $200.00 per share 
based on a sale in 1974. (Tr. 23ll This means the total 
value of the water stock was $200 x 424 shares = $84,800.00. 
Obviously, the purchase price of $52,660.05 (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 14> was not meant to include water stock which had a 
value more than one and one-half times greater. 
The holding of the trial court that the water rights 
represented by the subject water stock was appurtenant to 
the land sold to Christensen is contrary to both the law and 
the facts. 
Regarding Abbott's intention as to the water stock in 
question, Abbott testified that he intentionally did not in-
clude the water stock in the contract of sale for the Reary 
Place because of the terms of the joint venture termination 
agreement. Abbott's intention was to transfer the Reary 
water to the Taylor ranch. Abbott testified that Christen-
sen was going to transfer part of his own water stock from 
the Birch Place to the Reary Place. (Tr. 391,392) Christen-
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sen testified that he did, in fact, transfer 50 shares of 
water to the Reary Place. <Tr. 274, 275l 
In preparing contracts of sale for division of the 
joint venture real property, Abbott specifically included 
water stock with other parcels of real property which were 
transferred to Christensen. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 26 a~ 
79) The fact that water stock was specifically included 
within the contracts for the other properties and not in-
eluded in the contract for the Reary Place further shows 
Abbott's intention regarding the transfer of the stock in 
question. 
In Christensen's memorandum opposing the trial Court's 
preliminary decision to disallow his claim for the stock, it 
is argued that the sale contract's reference to the Buyer's 
obligation to "pay all taxes and assessments" was indica-
tive of Abbott's intent to include the water stock. How-
ever, when taken in context, as reproduced below, that 
phrase refers to assessments in the nature of taxes, such as 
special assessments for improvement districts or similar 
purposes. 
"TAXES 
~~-The parties further mutally agree that the 
Seller shall pay all taxes and assessments of any , 
kind and nature up to the time Buyer takes possession 
of said premises, which is Now in possession; that 
the Buyer shall pay all taxes and assessments the~e­
after and for so long as this contract shall remain 
in force." <Plaintiff's Exhibit 14l 
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Even if interpreted in the manner urged by Christensen, 
the contract of sale and escrow agreement in the instant 
case did not go so far as the contract and escrow agreement 
in Hatch, supra, where this Court decided in favor of the 
grantor's retention of water rights. In that case, the real 
estate contract and the escrow agreement contained the real 
property description and a statement "together with all 
buildings and improvements thereon and all water rights 
appurtenant thereto." [Emphasis added) 
The deciding factor in Hatch, supra seemed to hinge 
upon the fact that there were other water rights transferred 
with the property. 
"If repondent had no other water than the 7 1/2 
shares in question so that the reference to 
appurtenant water would not ref er to any other 
water, there would be presented a different 
situation." lat 761 
In the instant case, water rights are not mentioned in 
the contract except on the second page under the heading: 
"Abstract of Title, Warranty Deed, Etc. The Sellers agree 
that they will deposit with this agreement the following 
instruments: Warranty Deed, Water Certificate, Bill of 
Sale." <Plaintiff's Exhibit 141 
With the escrow documents is a bill of sale for 30 
shares of Farnsworth water. Abbott testified that this docu-
ment was included in the escrow because Christensen had 
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agreed to trade Vera Birch "30 shares of water for 30 share: 
in an oil well." (Tr. 417) 
It should also be pointed out that Christensen has 
other water available to transfer to the Reary Place. He 
had the following Farnsworth water rights at the time the 
joint venture property was divided: Birch #1, 351 shares; 
Birch #2, 35 shares; Lindsay Place, 392 shares; and, Zane 
Christensen Place, 1,964 shares. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 811 
The findings of fact entered by the trial court are 
inconsistant. Finding #6 is that the contracts between the 
parties dividing their interests in the joint venture real 
estate were "fully integrated." (Record, Civil No. 5800 
file, p. 83) If the contracts were fully integrated, the 
court erred in considering parol evidence regarding the 
water rights. State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 
413. Without the admission of parol evidence on the subject 
of water stock, the Court, in considering the contract, the 
statutes, and relevant case law, could only come to the con-
clusion that the water stock was not conveyed to Christen-
sen. 
-
Abbott respectfully urges that this Court find Christen· 
sen did not meet the burden imposed upon him to overcome the 
presumption created by Section 73-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, and that Finding of Fact #7 should be 
reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The case was tried to the lower court as an accounting 
between joint venturers. In an accounting, this Court may, 
in exercise of its equity powers, review both questions of 
law and fact. 
On appeal, the appellant is urging the Court to return 
the case to the lower court with the following instructions: 
(1) Perform a full accounting in accordance with 
the stipulation of the parties, taking into 
account: 
(a) the appellant's capital contributions to the 
joint venture; 
(b) the distribution of joint venture property 
upon termination of the business; 
(cl the appellant's $50,000 down payment on the 
Zane Christensen/Peterson Place property; 
(dl the agreement of the parties that respondent 
was to share only in profits from sale of 
the joint venture calves; and, 
(el losses from the joint venture are to be 
shared equally. 
(2l The cows replevied by Abbott belonged to him. 
(3) Christensen should not be given an award for care 
of Abbott's cows after termination of the joint venture, in 
accordance with the party's termination agreement. In the 
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alternate, Christensen's award should be limited to 
$8,808.75, in accordance with his own testimony. 
(4) Abbott is to retain the 424 shares of Farnsworu 
Canal Irrigation Company stock. 
Abbott, in support of his argument that the Court 
should order a full accounting has cited the stipulation ~ 
the parties and Utah statutory and case law. This Court hu 
held that in the distribution of assets in a joint venture, 
the Uniform Partnership Act (UPAl is controlling. Under t~ 
UPA, capital contributions of the joint venturers are 
considered liabilities of the venture. As such, in 
distribution of joint venture assets, they rank ahead of t~ 
distribution of profits owed to partners. 
The accounting made by the special master did not 
include Abbott's capital contributions. It did, however, 
include Christensen's capital contributions. To not also 
include Abbott's capital contributions is inequitable. 
Further, Abbott's expenditure of $50,000 as a down 
payment on the Zane Christensen/Peterson Place, was made in 
furtherance of the joint venture's business. This was a 
capital contribution for which Abbott should be given credit. 
In calculating the profits and losses of the joint 
venture, the agreement of the parties should be controlling. 
The testimony of both Abbott and Christensen showed that 
Christensen was to share only in the profit from the sale 
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of calves (calculated after deduction of expenses of the 
joint venture). The agreement was silent on the sharing of 
losses. 
Where an agreement is silent on the sharing of losses 
in a joint venture, this Court has ruled that joint venturers 
must share the losses. Further, Christensen's arguments that 
the business was a partnership and the similarity of a joint 
venture to a partnership support the application of partner-
ship law in this case. That law requires sharing of losses 
in the same proportion as profits when the agreement is 
silent on allocation of losses 
Abbott has shown the joint venture agreement allowed 
for sharing of profits from calve sales only between the 
parties. The cows which were replevied by Abbott belonged to 
him under the joint venture agreement and under the 
termination agreement. Abbott should not be forced to pay 
for his own property. 
In the termination agreement, Christensen received a 
more than generous settlement for his interest in the joint 
venture. Abbott testified that, as part of that agreement, 
Christensen was to care for Abbott's cows during the winter 
and spring of 1975 without extra compensation. Further, hay 
from the joint venture was used to feed the cows. Abbott 
should not be required to pay for the care and feed when it 
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was part of the Christensen's duties under the termination 
agreement. 
In the alternate, Christensen testified that he 
expected to receive compensaton of $500 per month in caring 
for the cows. Adding that amount to Christensen's claimed 
one-half interest in the joint venture hay, the maximum 
amount Christensen should receive for the cow's care is 
$8,808.75. 
Under Utah statutory and case law, Christensen had t~ 
burden of proving that the 424 shares of Farnsworth canal 
Irrigation Company stock was appurtenant to the Reary Place 
land that Abbott sold to Christensen. The test under that 
burden required him to Ill show by "clear and convincing" 
evidence that the water stock was appurtenant to the land and 1 
121 show Abbott intended to convey the water stock even 
though no express mention of the water stock was made. 
A review of the testimony and evidence shows that 
Christensen failed to meet the "clear and convincing" part cl 
the test. Further, Abbott's intention not to include the 
water stock was well supported by the evidence and his 
testimony. 
In addition, the lo~er court's finding of fact that 
the contracts prepared upon termination of the joint venture 
were fully integrated precluded the admission of parol 
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evidence to overcome the fact that the water stock was not 
included in the sale of the Reary Place to Christensen. 
For the reasons stated above, Abbott respectfully 
submits that this Court should grant him relief on all issues 
raised on this appeal. 
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